CANADA-ISRAEL COMMITTEE SUBMISSION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
“DIALOGUE ON FOREIGN POLICY”
APRIL 2003
THE CANADA-ISRAEL COMMITTEE
The Canada-Israel Committee (CIC) is the official representative of the organized Canadian Jewish community on matters pertaining to Canada-Israel relations. With the aim of promoting and advancing the Canada-Israel relationship, the CIC communicates on a regular basis with Members of Parliament, Senators, departmental officials, provincial and municipal governments, journalists, academics and others who have an impact on public opinion in Canada. The staff and lay leadership of the CIC provide expertise and technical support to the general Canadian community and Jewish organizations on issues relating to Canada's Middle East policy, Israel and the Middle East.
The CIC is the umbrella organization for Jewish groups and communities representing Canadian Jewry from coast to coast. Its major sponsors are B'nai Brith Canada, Canadian Jewish Congress, Canadian Zionist Federation, UIA Federations Canada and the Jewish communities of Canada, all of which are represented on the Board of Directors, CIC's policy-making body.
I. Introduction
The Canada-Israel Committee (CIC) welcomes the opportunity to participate in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s ‘Dialogue on Foreign Policy’ by submitting this position paper outlining our views about Canadian foreign policy in general and the Middle East in particular. It is our hope that this submission will assist the Department as it reflects upon means to strengthen Canada’s international standing in the changing global political environment.
The last foreign policy review took place in 1995 when the Government of Canada, following an extensive Parliamentary review, released a statement, Canada in the World that outlined Canada’s three key foreign policy objectives: “the protection of our security within a stable global framework; the promotion of prosperity and employment; and the promotion of the values and culture that Canadians cherish.” Since the release of the 1995 paper, momentous changes have occurred in the international arena (e.g. the reconfiguration and reunification of European states, September 11th and its aftermath and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s Africa agenda), thereby necessitating an urgent need to reassess Canadian foreign policy priorities. As Canada re-examines its priorities, we believe that there are new opportunities for Canada to re-orient its foreign policy to reflect these changes and adjust its approach to the Arab-Israel conflict.
The Middle East remains today, as it was in 1995, a quagmire requiring urgent attention. The American-led victories in Afghanistan and Iraq and the impending effort to revive the moribund Israeli-Palestinian ‘peace process’ necessitates a fresh approach by Canada towards the Middle East. While Canada is fortunate to be viewed by all states in the region as a fair and peaceful nation that has made substantial contributions in that region, in recent years its reputation as mediator, peacekeeper and facilitator has waned. With the region on the cusp of substantial change, it is hoped that Canada will once again play a significant and constructive role.
II. Canadian Foreign Policy – General Issues
This section briefly addresses a number of thematic issues and questions posed in the ‘Dialogue Paper’ prepared by DFAIT outlining and discussing the three ‘pillars’ of Canadian foreign policy. As per its community mandate, the CIC has responded to the questions in the context of Canadian foreign policy towards the Middle East.
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS & MULTILATERALISM
Canada is a member of many international organizations, including the G8, NATO, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Arctic Council. Should our participation in any of these be strengthened, or adjusted?
Canada has traditionally taken a very favourable position towards international institutions and the policy of multilateralism. Canada views international institutions as important mechanisms through which the views of the international community are given expression, and the forums in which grievances are aired and, when Member States are so inclined, resolved. Moreover, in an increasingly interdependent global system, these fora serve as the most appropriate mechanisms to manage such transnational issues as international crime, health and environmental matters, as well as trade related issues.
Canada has benefited enormously, by many measurements (e.g., economically, culturally, scientifically, etc.,), through its participation in various international institutions. Most importantly, these institutions have assisted Canada in projecting its views and interests onto the international arena. For all these reasons, Canada should not depart from its strong adherence to multilateralism and its membership in a myriad of international institutions.
Nevertheless, a number of the international institutions that Canada clearly holds dear have extremely problematic aspects to them, particularly as they relate to the Middle East in general and Israel in particular – the most prominent of which is the United Nations (UN) and its agencies. While the United Nations played a key role in the creation of the State of Israel, its relationship to the Jewish State since the 1950s has been shaped by the numerical superiority of states hostile towards Israel and organizational problems within the UN system. As a result, Israel is the only country in the world that is not eligible to sit on the Security Council, the principal policymaking body of the UN. In addition, Israel is the object of more investigative committees, special representatives and rapporteurs than any other state in the UN system.
When Canada took its non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in the late 1990s, then-Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy declared that Canada’s goal was to use its term as a catalyst for reforming the increasingly dysfunctional international organization. Regrettably, there has been no discernible improvement in the activities of UN agencies; to the contrary, there has been an incremental deterioration in the quality of performance throughout the vast UN system. Symptomatic of this deterioration is the way in which anti-democratic regimes have succeeded in forcing their own into the international body’s leadership echelon. For example, Syria was elected recently to the Security Council and the UN Commission for Human Rights, at the same time as Damascus continues to finance, supply, train, and provide safe haven to Hezbollah and a dozen Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It is equally offensive that Libya, with one of the world’s most horrific records on human rights and support for terrorism, should sit as the current chair of the Commission for Human Rights. In both of these cases, the nomination to these powerful positions came through the UN’s Asian regional grouping, a body that continues to blackball Israel’s membership. It is also important to note that it was at a meeting of the Asian group, convened in Tehran, Iran, that the anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic draft resolutions that were considered at the infamous Durban Conference (September 2001) were crafted.
To its credit, Canada, along with only Australia, registered formal reservations about the Middle East provisions of the Durban conference communiqué. Canada was also one of only 3 countries to oppose Libya’s nomination to head the UN Commission for Human Rights. At the 58th session of the UNCHR in the spring of 2002, Canada stood alone, or with only 1 or 2 other countries, in opposing resolutions blatantly unfair in their treatment of Israel. It is also the case that Canada was instrumental in facilitating Israel’s partial admission into the UN’s Western European and Others Group (WEOG).
Despite these constructive activities, however, Canada continues to support the vast majority of anti-Israel resolutions that are habitually considered in the General Assembly and in UN functional agencies; on some occasions, Canada signals its dissatisfaction with some of the more inflammatory language in resolutions unfairly critical of Israel by registering fatuous abstentions. But it is rare for Canada to take a firm stand against the abuses of Israel that pass for standard-operating-procedure at the United Nations.
Serious deficiencies in Canada’s approach to international institutions are not restricted to the UN. At the La Francophonie summit in Beirut, Lebanon, in the fall of 2002, senior Canadian officials sat quietly as delegates from Arab and Muslim countries used the forum to ridicule and demonize Israel. Ideally, critics argued, the Canadian delegation should have quit the conference in protest; at a minimum, Canada should have used its formal address to complain about the extent to which the important humanitarian mandate of the conference of French-speaking countries had been perverted for excessively narrow political purposes.
Canada must understand that what is at stake when the UN and other international institutions stray so dramatically from their mandates is not merely the credibility of those institutions, but also the credibility of Canadian foreign policy itself. Each time the agenda of a UN agency is subverted to anti-Israel interests, each time Israel is denied its rightful place as a full member-in-good-standing of the international community, the cornerstone of Canada’s international credibility is weakened.
Canada could improve the situation at the UN and other international institutions by taking the moral leadership in constructing a “Democracy Caucus” that can, at least on a moral level, counter the overwhelming influence of the anti-democratic and totalitarian countries and regions. And Canada must ensure that Israel, which already shares with Canada a firm commitment to democracy, gender equality, respect for religious and political diversity, and the non-violent resolution of disputes, is accorded the full respect due it in international institutions.
While Canada’s continued commitment to multilateral diplomacy is commendable, this must not become an impediment to effective action. As the impotence of the United Nations Security Council in dealing with the recent Iraq crisis indicates, a multilateral response to international crises, while preferable, may not always be possible. Flexibility must remain a cornerstone of Canada’s approach to international diplomacy and crisis management.
Recommendations:
A. Canada should continue to project its interests through the various international multi-lateral bodies, while recognizing their institutional limitations and faults.
B. As a country committed to multilateral diplomacy, Canada must show moral leadership and help facilitate the type of radical structural and political reforms that will prevent the gross perversion of the UN system, thereby saving the world body from irrelevancy.
C. Canada must take a principled stand against all anti-Israel resolutions in international institutions, including those that mischievously refer to “occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem” or the Palestinian “right of return” to Israel, or that misrepresent UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as demanding Israel’s unilateral withdrawal to the June 1967 lines.
D. Abstentions – while representative of a constructive inclination – are inadequate responses by Canada to the crass marginalization and subversion of the UN system. If a resolution does not meet the tests of fairness, balance, constructive language and the avoidance of singling out one UN member state (i.e., Israel) for discriminatory treatment, that resolution warrants a negative Canadian vote.
E. Canada must give tangible expression to its commitment to protect Israel from isolation in international institutions, by working toward its full admission into the UN’s Western European and Others Group, if not into Israel’s natural geographic grouping, the Asian bloc of countries.
F. Canada should lead efforts to create a “Democracy Caucus” that will counter the predominant influence of anti-democratic countries in international institutions, and take steps to ensure Israel’s full participation in the caucus.
PROMOTING CANADIAN VALUES
Are values such as human rights, democracy, respect for diversity and gender equality ones that Canada should continue to advocate in all parts of the world? If so, what are the best ways of doing this?
Canadians support their government’s use of foreign policy to project the values and traditions that Canadians hold dear, such as democracy, respect for political and religious diversity, gender equality, and the resolution of disputes through dialogue and compromise rather than the resort to violence. Therefore, the government must continue making the promotion of Canadian values a central goal and tool of our foreign policy agenda. Moreover, the level of Canada’s bi-lateral relationship with various states should be contingent on their respect for democratic values. To this end, Canada’s relationship with the democratic world at large should be fundamentally different (e.g., in terms of trade, governmental visits, and cultural, scientific and educational exchanges) from those states that continue to repress their citizens and demonstrate contempt for human rights.
Unfortunately, in the Palestinian Authority and most of the surrounding Arab and Muslim countries, which lack a basic affinity toward democracy and democratic principles, Canadian efforts to transmit such values fall on deaf ears. By contrast, Israel has a flourishing democratic tradition that shares the social and political values Canadians cherish. Canadians should understand that the broadening and institutionalizing of bilateral ties with a fellow democracy, Israel, will establish the firm foundation upon which Canada can continue its efforts to promote democratic values to the anti-democratic countries of the Middle East.
There is growing concern that Canadian development assistance to the PA areas, administered mainly by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), is being used in ways inconsistent with the values that Canadians wish to project through their foreign policy. Ostensibly “humanitarian organizations” that receive direct or indirect Canadian assistance might in reality be fronts for terrorist groups. The bulk of Canada’s assistance goes to the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency, UNRWA, an anachronistic institution whose behaviour has become increasingly dubious in recent months. UNRWA-administered refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza have become major centres of terrorist activities, and UNRWA vehicles, including ambulances, have been used to smuggle terrorists and weapons past Israeli checkpoints. UNRWA, using funds contributed by Canada and other donor countries, purchases controversial Palestinian textbooks. Objective analysts have determined that these textbooks contain anti-Israel and even anti-Semitic elements and, as such, promote among Palestinian children maximum hatred and rejection of Israel – the type of attitudes that lead Palestinian children to become suicide bombers. As a stakeholder, Canada has a responsibility to ensure that UNRWA remains fully accountable for its activities in the disputed territories.
Recommendations
A. The strength by which Canada engages in any bilateral relationship should be measured by that country’s respect for Canadian values.
B. The promotion of Canadian values should be a key component and goal of Canadian foreign policy.
C. A bilateral consultative forum should be established through which Canadian parliamentarians and their Israeli counterparts will jointly engage in efforts to enhance and expand the scope and quality of bilateral relations for the benefit of both countries. As the political regimes in the PA areas and in neighbouring Arab and Muslim countries democratize, the bilateral consultative forum should be broadened to include their political representatives as well.
D. Canada must ensure that its development assistance to the PA areas is used in ways consistent with Canadian values, such as respect for religious and political diversity, and the negotiated resolution of political differences.
E. Canada must demand full accountability from international humanitarian agencies, such as UNRWA, to which Canadian funds are contributed. Canada must also ensure that Canadian agencies, such as CIDA, responsible for the direct or indirect distribution of aid to the PA areas, behave in a manner consistent with Canadian policy and practice.
F. Canada must link its Middle East development assistance programs to a demonstrable commitment to democratization and opposition to terrorism on the part of groups in the PA areas and in neighbouring Arab countries.
PEACEKEEPING
How does the military best serve Canada’s foreign policy objectives: though national and continental defence; combat missions in support of international coalitions; peacekeeping; all of the above?
Canadians have taken great and justifiable pride in their country’s standing as “peacekeepers to the world.” Indeed, it was for his role in creating the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that was interposed between Israeli and Egyptian troops in the Sinai Desert at the end of the 1956 War, that then Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson was awarded the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize. Canadians, to this day, continue to believe that it is primarily through international peacekeeping that Canada can contribute towards the peaceful resolution of global conflicts.
While peacekeeping justifiably remains an important component of Canada’s foreign policy, there are at least two factors that must be taken into consideration as Canadians determine the current priority of peacekeeping amidst the plethora of other interests they wish their government to pursue through foreign policy.
First, as noted by a growing number of commentators and senior government officials (including Defence Minister John MaCallum himself), the Canadian military is now stretched to the brink, and probably does not have the resources necessary to fulfill the peacekeeping obligations it currently has, let alone additional ones.
Second, there is reason to believe that the traditional approach to peacekeeping that Canada perfected in the period following the Sinai War, is no longer appropriate given the fundamental changes in the nature of global conflict since the end of the Cold War. The passive approach to peacekeeping, i.e., the interposing of “blue helmets” in regional conflicts, worked sufficiently well to keep the superpowers from coming to blows during the Cold War. However, today, many regional conflicts are either tribal wars inside a country or conflicts between competing national movements. In such situations, traditional forms of passive peacekeeping are less relevant than active peacemaking. Peacemaking involves an entirely different set of physical resources and political skills than those with which the Canadian military is currently equipped, not the least of which being the leverage to compel one or the other recalcitrant party to modify their political demands and enter into a legitimate negotiating process. Without taking anything away from the sincere efforts of Canadian forces in the Balkans and Afghanistan, it is doubtful whether Canadians have either the resources or the political will to devote to retrofitting their military forces to perform the new task of peacemaking.
Recently, the Canadian government has unilaterally begun work on proposals and ideas for a peacekeeping or observer force to assist in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In September 2002, senior officials from the departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs addressed a symposium in Israel on the subject, funded and organized by the Canadian government in cooperation with a number of Israeli organizations and individuals committed to conflict resolution. The Canadian government plans to organize a parallel conference in the Palestinian territories. Given Canada’s official stance (declared in the UN Security Council and elsewhere) that no peacekeeping force can be imposed without the full cooperation and consent of all sides, the apparent absence of a willing Palestinian partner may prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to Canada’s plans.
Israel, for its part, has been reluctant to see international peacekeepers introduced into Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy for several reasons.
First, Israel has always been averse to the “internationalization” of the process. The essence of the Madrid/Oslo process is that there is no alternative to direct, bilateral negotiations involving the parties to the conflict themselves. While there may well be a role for third-parties in facilitating the implementation of an agreement, only the conflicting parties themselves can work out the agreement. The introduction of an international peacekeeping force in the absence a bilateral agreement is viewed by Israel as premature at best, and, at worst, as an attempt by the Arabs and their allies in the Non-Aligned Movement to impose a solution on Israel favouring the Palestinians.
Second, Israel has also voiced concern that international peacekeepers would unwittingly (or perhaps in some case knowingly) provide safe haven to Palestinian terrorists while at the same time hindering Israeli counter-terrorism operations. The collapse of the UN Emergency Force in Sinai on the eve of the Six-Day War was a bitter disappointment to Israel; so to was the behaviour of the UN peacekeepers in south Lebanon who stood idle while Hezbollah terrorists kidnapped three IDF soldiers from Israel’s side of the UN-designated border, in October 2000, and then obstructed Israel’s pursuit of information about the kidnapped soldiers by lying about the existence of a videotape of part of the incident.
Finally, as noted, Israel believes that outside intervention, in the form of an international or multinational peacekeeping/peacemaking force, would only be helpful once a peace settlement with the Palestinians has been negotiated and a framework established for its implementation. Given the absence of any perceptible interest toward this end on the part of the current Palestinian leadership, discussion of a Canadian role in this regard is certainly premature.
Recommendations:
A. Canada must condition its participation in any peacekeeping or peacemaking force interposed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the full consent of all sides.
B. Canada must determine whether it has the resources required to undertake active peacemaking, as opposed to passive peacekeeping, in the Israel-Palestinian relationship.
C. Even as it seeks to generate support for future peacemaking activities in the region, Canada should work to persuade the Palestinians of the indispensability of direct, bilateral negotiations involving themselves and the Israelis.
NATIONAL SECURITY
In promoting the security of Canadians, where should our priorities lie? Should Canada give a higher priority to military combat operations? To sectors such as intelligence gathering and analysis? Or should we focus on broader security measures, such as combating environmental degradation and the spread of infectious disease? What should be our distinctive role in promoting global security?
Canada was one of the first countries to pledge its support to the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks. However, the integrity of Canada’s commitment to the struggle against international terrorists, and the countries that sponsor them, is compromised when senior Canadian officials speak about a “clash of civilizations” or the need for wealthy, developed countries to address the “root causes” of the frustration and animosity of less developed countries. To be credible and effective, Canadian foreign policy must unambiguously declare that terrorism – the taking of civilian life for political purposes – is never justifiable, and reinforce this declaration with tangible action. By the same token, while the inclusion of Hamas, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to Canada’s “List of Terrorist Entities” was important, Canada’s hesitancy in adding Hezbollah to the List, based on a skewed understanding of the Lebanese-based group’s predominant hatred toward Israel, betrayed a glaring deficiency in Canada’s commitment to the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, the Canadian government is to be commended for resisting domestic and international political and economic pressure to reverse the decision to add Hezbollah to the Solicitor General's list of outlawed terrorist organizations, once that decision was finally taken.
There is still a second level of the struggle against international terrorism that Canada must address more aggressively. Indeed, the key to countering if not ending completely the threat posed by terrorist groups is to cut off the financial and logistical support for these groups provided by rogue regimes who continue to view the sponsorship of international terrorism as a legitimate tool of foreign policy.
To be sure, Canada is to be commended for its leadership in promoting UN resolutions generally designed to isolate terror-sponsoring countries. However, Canada has failed to reinforce such steps with specific substantive action. For example, Canada has consistently refused to modify its commercial trade relations with Iran, even though Tehran is widely recognized as the single most flagrant sponsor of anti-Israeli terrorist groups including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is important to recall that it was many tons of Iranian heavy weapons destined for Palestinian terrorist groups that were captured by Israeli soldiers aboard the "Karine A" cargo ship owned and operated by officials of Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority. Recall also that Iranian agents have been implicated in terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish community institutions in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in the 1990s, as well as terrorist atrocities against US and other Western nationals in Lebanon in the early- to mid-1980s. By failing to cut its profitable commercial relations with Tehran, or at least restricting trade with Iran to humanitarian goods, Canada is inadvertently signalling to Iran's extremist regime that it can continue sponsoring international terrorism with impunity.
While it does not have the same type of potential economic leverage with other Middle Eastern terror-sponsoring states including Syria, Libya and Sudan, there are steps that Canada can and should take on its own and in coordination with other right-minded countries, to isolate these regimes and punish them for their reckless behaviour. At a minimum, Canada should continue to use every opportunity in international institutions to condemn Syria's ongoing active support for Hezbollah and a dozen Palestinian terrorist groups based in Damascus or in the Syrian-controlled Bekka Valley in eastern Lebanon.
Finally, Canada should consider using its substantial economic, cultural and political contacts with Lebanon to encourage the Lebanese to use whatever resources they have at their disposal independent of their Syrian masters to rein-in Hezbollah. At a minimum, Canada should tie its generous development assistance to Lebanon to substantive efforts by Beirut to crack down on Hezbollah and other terror groups using Lebanese sovereign territory to attack Israel.
Recommendations:
A. Canada must reaffirm its absolute intolerance of international terrorism and of the rogue regimes that sponsor terrorists and supply them with conventional (and possibly, non-conventional) weapons.
B. Canada must immediately formulate a more comprehensive list of terrorist organizations and add additional groups to it, including those directly responsible for terror attacks against Israeli citizens.
C. Canada must take substantive measures (e.g., diplomatic and trade) to signal its disapproval of states that sponsor terrorism. It should carry out these measures both at the bi-lateral level and through international fora and institutions.
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING
The need for cooperation among the intelligence agencies of democratic countries has grown proportionate to the dramatic increase in the terrorist threat since 9/11. There has been an appropriate increase in the level and scope of intelligence sharing involving CSIS and other Canadian security agencies on the one hand, and their counterparts primarily in the United States and Western Europe, on the other hand. Israel, a democratic country with unprecedented experience in the gathering and analyzing of intelligence about Middle East terrorist groups and the regimes that sponsor them, should be brought fully into Canada’s consultative process.
Recommendation:
A. Canada should establish a comprehensive bilateral security protocol with Israel that will institutionalize the process of sharing intelligence, expertise and technology directed at countering international terrorism and other threats to regional and global stability.
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Should Canada do more to address conditions giving rise to conflict and insecurity beyond our borders? If so, where?
Clearly, rumours of Islamic extremism's demise are vastly exaggerated. Though seemingly on the wane in the 1990s, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, along with more recent terrorist atrocities in Bali, Kenya, Tunisia and elsewhere, targeting Israelis and Western nationals, indicate that the threat posed by Islamic extremism remains significant and is in fact growing exponentially. Groups loosely affiliated with Osama bin-Laden's Al-Qaeda terrorist network, as well as Islamic extremist groups sponsored by Iran and other rogue regimes, constitute a real and immediate threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, there is some suggestion that Islamic ‘extremism’ is even going mainstream - becoming the de facto standard orientation within the Moslem world. It is naive for Canadians to believe that they are somehow immune from the scourge of Islamic-inspired terrorism. It is imperative that Canada continue to work with other like-minded countries and with international institutions to isolate and cut-off this international menace at its source, including the funding provided for Islamic terror organizations by Iran, Sudan and elements of the Saudi elite. Canada must also avoid the tendency to "rationalize" or "explain" Islamic terrorism, by suggesting that the countries of the "North" should understand the "root causes" of "Southern" discontent with their lot in life. Canada must make unambiguously clear, through substantive actions, that terrorism - the deliberate taking of civilian life for political purposes - can never be justified, not on religious, nor on political grounds.
Recommendations
A. Canada must continue to work with other like-minded countries and with international institutions to isolate and cut-off this international menace at its source, including the funding provided for Islamic terror organizations by Iran, Sudan and elements of the Saudi elite.
B. Canada must also avoid the tendency to "rationalize" or "explain" Islamic terrorism, by suggesting that the countries of the "North" should understand the "root causes" of "southern" discontent with their lot in life. Canada must make unambiguously clear, through substantive actions, that terrorism - the deliberate taking of civilian life for political purposes - can never be justified, especially on religious grounds.
III. Canadian Foreign Policy in the Middle East
This third section focuses on issues directly related to Canada-Israel relations, and the Middle East peace process.
CANADA-ISRAEL BILATERAL RELATIONS
Our outstanding experience over the last half-dozen years with the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement (CIFTA) and the Canada-Israel Industrial Research and Development Foundation (CIIRDF), provides conclusive evidence of substantial benefits to both countries of increasing close bilateral ties. The economic successes that both nations have enjoyed as a result of the CIIRDF and CIFTA can be replicated in other domains such as health, agriculture, education, and social services. Realization of the potential gains will require the consolidated effort of the public, voluntary and business sectors. The horrific events of September 11 also point to additional areas where shared Canadian and Israeli expertise can serve as a pillar of the bilateral relationship, including enhanced security and counter-terrorism cooperation as well as joint disaster-relief services to afflicted regions during times of need.
Canada and Israel have enjoyed a special friendship since the inception of the Jewish state in 1948. For many years, however, the relationship was limited primarily to Canadian political support for her besieged sister democracy in the Middle East.
Both CIIRDF and CIFTA were initially met with considerable resistance and scepticism within Canada for a variety of long-debated political, strategic and economic reasons. The empirical evidence, however, has invalidated the cynical view and demonstrated a remarkable success story instead. In the midst of a technological revolution of historical proportions, CIIRDF has facilitated joint venturing among cutting-edge enterprises on an unprecedented level that would not have otherwise been realized. Even more dramatically, CIFTA has, through the removal of trade barriers, fuelled dual trade growth on an exponential level. The net result has been a synergy of reciprocal investment and technical and commercial cooperation between Canada and Israel far beyond the realm of imagination only six years ago. It has become abundantly clear that the distance and differences between our two nations should not be perceived as liabilities but as assets. Advantages that accrue to one nation need not necessarily be at the expense of the other – both can win through increased cooperation.
Over the years, Canada and Israel have entered into numerous agreements, with varying degrees of success. We must now take stock of existing agreements, many of which are more symbolic than substantive or have been dormant for too long. It is necessary to revitalize and renew those arrangements that remain relevant to the bilateral relationship’s future needs, discard those whose time has past and identify new frontiers of engagement that will prove mutually advantageous. In order to achieve optimal results in this multidimensional undertaking, the ultimate goal should be a formal, comprehensive agreement between our two countries which will weave together all of these elements into one cohesive effort.
Of late, Canada and Israel have also experienced more frequent and sustained contact on the political level. This is reflected in the increased communication between the Canada-Israel Parliamentary Friendship Group and its Israeli counterpart, as well as in the number of repeat visits that parliamentarians are making to and from Israel. The establishment of a formal consultative forum comprised of parliamentarians from both Israel and Canada will offer an innovative responsive vehicle for the identification and promotion of new initiatives that would benefit both countries and strengthen bilateral ties.
Government-to-government agreements represent the foundation of strong and durable bilateral ties. Cooperation on the political level can build upon that foundation, thereby ensuring that the relationship remains vital and dynamic. However, in order for the equation to be complete, there is a need to reinforce these two components by more actively engaging the non-governmental and voluntary sectors in bilateral enterprises. Some will tap into the area of international humanitarian assistance while others will explore shared interests in the fields of culture, education, social programs and the like. Separately, each of these three elements is a necessary but insufficient condition to ensure the vitality of the bilateral relationship. Together, they represent a guaranteed formula for the long term growth and prosperity of Canada-Israel relations.
Recommendations:
A. Canada must separate its concerns about the Arab-Israeli dispute from its bilateral relationship with the Jewish state.
B. Canada and Israel should together implement a comprehensive, strategic agreement to clarify and strengthen the bilateral relationship.
C. Together with Israel, Canada should establish a consultative forum through which Canadian and Israeli parliamentarians will jointly engage in efforts to enhance and expand the scope and quality of bilateral relations for the benefit of both countries.
D. Canada should establish a comprehensive bilateral security protocol with Israel that will institutionalize the process of sharing intelligence, expertise and technology directed at countering international terrorism and other threats to global and regional stability.
Israel’s Right to Self-Defence
The post-9/11 period has created a certain moral clarity about divisions in international affairs: to paraphrase US President George W. Bush, a country is either opposed to the forces of terrorism or is one of them, a country is either democratic or anti-democratic in political orientation. Israel clearly opposes terrorism and is democratic – indeed, it is the only democracy in the entire Middle East. These fundamental realities must be reflected in Canadian foreign policy.
Canadians must understand that, 54 years after its founding, Israel is still confronted with existential threats. The root cause of conflict in the Middle East always has been, and remains, the refusal of the Arab and Muslim countries to accept the legitimacy of an independent Jewish state anywhere in the Middle East. In the Oslo peace accords, PLO leader Yasser Arafat formally recognized Israel’s existence. But, at no time has Arafat ever recognized Israel’s right to exist, and he continues to use violence, terror and incitement as primary tools toward achieving his ultimate goal of destroying the Jewish state. The call by the new Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), for an end to terrorism against Israel is already being severely challenged by militant Palestinian factions such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and rejectionist elements of Abbas’s own mainstream Fatah movement.
Canada must also understand that there can be no half-measures in the war on terrorism, nor is there a “neat and clean” way for a democratic country such as Israel to wage an effective counter-terrorism campaign against fanatics who are eager to die, and who cynically use Palestinian children as “human shields” by setting up their bases of terrorist operations in civilian population centres. Notwithstanding the always regretted and inadvertent injury and loss of life among Palestinian civilians that sometimes occur during Israeli counter-terrorism operations, Canadians must understand that the primary responsibility of any government, including Israel’s, must be the protection of its citizens.
While Canada’s support for the security and wellbeing of Israel is longstanding and firm, criticism by senior Canadian officials of Israel’s alleged use of “disproportionate force” in responding to Palestinian terror attacks, combined with a tendency on Canada’s part to place the onus for violence on Israel, is cause for concern. Now more than ever, Canada must substantiate its declared support for Israel’s security with tangible actions.
Recommendations:
A. Canada’s support for Israel’s security and right to self-defence must be absolute and unqualified, just as Israel would unconditionally support Canada if it were confronted with unrelenting threats to its existence.
B. Canada must affirm that, like any other sovereign state, Israel alone has the right to determine the appropriate steps required to ensure the security of its citizens. Canada must affirm that Israel, a democratic and moral country, has since October 2000 been engaged in an existential struggle against an anti-democratic and immoral Palestinian leadership headed by Yasser Arafat who would stop at nothing in pursuing the goal of destroying the Jewish state.
C. Canada must avoid holding Israel to unreasonable expectations about its reaction to terror. Canada’s call for a “proportionate response” to the cold-blooded terrorist murder of Israeli children betrays a remarkable Canadian lack of sensitivity about the goals of the Palestinian leadership headed by Yasser Arafat, and about the complexities confronting Israel’s government in protecting its citizens.
CANADA AND THE PALESTINIANS
Canada has assisted and should be encouraged to continue assisting the Palestinian people to fulfill their potential, whether through providing practical relief or by helping build core institutions of Palestinian civil society. At the same time, and along with other donor countries, Canada must acknowledge and address the incontrovertible evidence of waste and corruption on the part of Palestinian leaders and the Palestinian Authority. Canada should persuade other donors to follow the Canadian lead and direct all financial support to the Palestinian areas through transparent and responsible international agencies like the World Bank and the IMF as well as reputable, domestic-based NGO’s independent of the PA and the PLO.
Canadians are justifiably proud of the contribution their country makes towards achieving stability in the Middle East, including generous development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This should be continued and enhanced wherever practicable.
Senior officials betrayed a serious deficiency in Canada’s Middle East policy by responding to President Bush’s June 24, 2002 proposals by insisting that Canada continued to view Yasser Arafat as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and by asserting that “no one can tell the Palestinians who their leaders ought to be.” Such Canadian policy statements were made despite the incontrovertible evidence that Arafat had consistently failed to act in the best interests of his own people, with disastrous consequences. An important contribution toward peacemaking and toward enhancing the quality of life of the Palestinian people would be made by Canada if it were to concentrate on persuading the Palestinians that democratization and further regime change within the PA are in their national interest, and by focusing their diplomatic relations with Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and his new, more pragmatic Cabinet, rather than Yasser Arafat and the ancien regime.
A particular failure on Canada’s part relates to its ambiguous interventions with Palestinians regarding the so-called “Right of Return”. Canada should acknowledge that if a “Right of Return” to present-day Israel were implemented for between 3.5 and 5 million Palestinians, this would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state. Palestinian political aspirations cannot be satisfied at the expense of the right of self-determination of the Jewish state.
Canada should emphasize that UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (1948) does not grant Palestinians a “Right of Return” to Israel. Indeed, it makes no mention of “rights” at all. Rather, it speaks only of refugees being accorded “permission” to return to their homes if practicable, or to receive compensation. Moreover, the resolution limits repatriation to those who are prepared to “live at peace with their neighbours”. Canada should acknowledge that, as a sovereign state, only Israel has the authority to determine who should be granted entry visas, just as any other county determines its own immigration policy. Finally, Canada should emphasize that a “Right of Return” does not exist in international law.
Canada should continue to emphasize the concept of “options” for Palestinian refugees and be prepared to participate in an international fund for permanent resettlement in their places of current residence, in third countries (possibly including Canada), or in a future West Bank-Gaza entity.
Finally, Canada should acknowledge that the regional refugee problem is not an exclusively Palestinian one. Any solution must also take into account the interests of the hundreds of thousands of Jews who were forced to abandon their homes and properties in Arab and Islamic lands around the time of Israel’s founding.
Recommendations
A. Canada should make the transfer of development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza conditional on a fundamental and sustained commitment on the part of the Palestinian leadership to end violence, terror and incitement against Israel. Moreover, Canadian funding should be linked to the PA instituting proper accounting procedures and demonstrating respect for the rights of its people.
B. Canada should actively encourage the Palestinians to adopt reasonable and realistic expectations about their relations with Israel. Specifically, Canada should encourage the Palestinians to abandon their demand for a “right of return” to present-day Israel which has served only as a major impediment in efforts to advance the peace process.
C. Canada must make clear to the Palestinian Authority that the expectation of fundamental structural and political reform is not negotiable. The current Palestinian leadership must be made to understand that the failure to meet these expectations will have serious political and economic consequences.
D. Canada must acknowledge that reform within the PA is not an end in itself, but will have meaning only if it is combined with efforts toward democratization and a sincere commitment to end violence, terror and anti-Israel incitement.
E. Canada must give tangible support to the proposition that the key to enhancing the quality of the lives of Palestinians and Israelis alike rests with significantly diminishing the personal power and authority of Yasser Arafat, who has repeatedly demonstrated that he is beyond rehabilitation.
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
The essence of the Oslo peace process was an exchange: In return for recognizing the PLO and entering into a formal diplomatic dialogue with it toward a permanent settlement, the late Yitzhak Rabin received from Yasser Arafat a commitment to end Palestinian violence and terror; to rein in and disarm militant factions; to resolve all outstanding disputes through direct, bilateral negotiations; and to instil in the Palestinian people an understanding of and respect for peace with their Israeli neighbours.
The Mitchell Report (May 2001) and the Tenet ceasefire agreement (June 2001) set the “immediate” and “unconditional” end to violence and the resumption of full Palestinian security cooperation with Israel as the essential preconditions for resuming the diplomatic process. All further developments, including a possible Israeli redeployment from Palestinian areas, the evacuation of settlement outposts and a freeze on settlement activity, are recommended reciprocal confidence-building measures, the consideration of which (according to Senator George Mitchell himself) cannot even begin until a sustained and verifiable ceasefire is in place.
In a June 24, 2002 address, US President George W. Bush declared that the achievement of a “two-state solution” involving Israel and an independent Palestinian state, was conditioned not only on the imposition of a verifiable ceasefire but also on fundamental reform within the Palestinian Authority (PA), including democratization and the emergence of a new leadership untainted by terrorism.
Unfortunately, Canada has often exhibited a reluctance to confront the Palestinian leadership for its chronic failure to abide by the written obligations it agreed to in the Oslo Accords and subsequent documents. While declaring its support in principle for the reforming of the PA, Canada stopped short of endorsing Bush’s call for regime change, insisting (as did most European Union countries) that Yasser Arafat remained a credible interlocutor. This insistence smacked in the face of reality and was unconstructive to the pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Also unconstructive – and inherently prejudicial – were statements attributed to senior Canadian officials implying a causal linkage between an end to Palestinian terror and an Israeli settlement freeze, as well as the moral equivalency between Palestinian terror attacks on the one hand, and Israel’s acts of legitimate self-defence on the other hand. Through such statements, Canada was signalling to Arafat the old guard Palestinian leadership that they could continue their campaign of terror against Israel with impunity.
With the active phase of the war in Iraq over, much governmental and international media attention is shifting to the “road map” towards an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement formulated by the Quartet, comprised of the foreign secretaries of the United States and Russia, along with senior representatives from the United Nations and European Union.
The road map, formally entitled "Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," is loosely based on the phased process prescribed in the Mitchell Report.
While the specific provisions of the road map are important, they must not detract from several core principles that we believe must relate to all efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian and broader Arab-Israeli conflict:
• No peace plan can be considered legitimate (and no plan can be endorsed by Canada) unless it begins with the unconditional, unambiguous and verifiable end to Palestinian violence, terror and anti-Israeli incitement. Vague statements attributed to PA officials about the desirability of ending terrorism are no longer sufficient. There must also be substantive proof of the PA's determination to shatter the terrorist networks that currently operate with impunity throughout Palestinian controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PA must also finally fulfill the commitment, undertaken by Yasser Arafat a decade ago in the original Oslo Accords, to educate the Palestinian people for peace with Israel. Although Israelis continue to strive for peaceful relations with their Arab and Muslim neighbours, and are prepared to make painful concessions toward that end, it is unreasonable to expect them to cede additional territory unilaterally, or as violence and terrorism continue unabated.
• The absolute end to Palestinian terror must be accompanied by demonstrable efforts by the PA toward fundamental political reform and democratization, as called for in President Bush's June 24, 2002 statement. It is hoped that, once the "democratic revolution" takes hold in the PA, the Palestinian people will strive to achieve the political rights and freedoms that Israelis already enjoy. Such a development can only enhance the prospects of an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement taking root and blossoming. Canada can play a role by promoting, through various initiatives in the PA areas, Canadian values of human rights, democracy and tolerance.
• Progress toward democratization cannot be divorced from fundamental reform within the PA. In his June 2002 statement, President Bush urged the Palestinian people to choose a new leadership "not compromised by terrorism." Much hope is currently being placed on the ability of the new PA Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), to institute a reformist agenda, one that acknowledges the futility of continued Palestinian terrorism against Israel. However, the historical record indicates that one should not underestimate the challenges ahead, especially those relating to Yasser Arafat's unwillingness to relinquish personal power and authority over the PA and the Palestinian movement in general. Israel has made clear its readiness to assist Mahmoud Abbas in instituting his agenda, once terrorism ends and the new PA administration demonstrates its commitment to peace and meaningful political reform. Canada should take substantive steps to encourage and assist pragmatic Palestinian forces in their inevitable power struggle with Arafat and the militants.
• A plan for achieving a permanent agreement involving Israelis and Palestinians has no chance of succeeding unless it is linked to the normalization of relations between Israel
and the entire Arab and Muslim world. The core of the conflict in the Middle East has never been Israel's "occupation of Palestinian land" or the broader relationship with the Palestinians. Rather, it is the refusal of the Arab and Muslim countries to recognize and accept Israel as the Jewish state, with full legitimacy within the Middle East community of nations. Canada, through its participation in various international institutions, should take the lead in encouraging organizations, such as the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization, to adopt resolutions according full recognition of Israel's legitimate right to exist as the Jewish state. Canada also should be encouraging these groups to normalize political and economic relations with Israel, and to end reprehensible anti-Israel and anti-Jewish propaganda and other forms of incitement in state-controlled mass media and educational systems throughout the Arab and Muslim world.
• As previously noted, a plan for Israeli-Palestinian permanent peace must explicitly acknowledge that there is no legal or moral basis for the right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. The fact that no war would have occurred in 1948-1949, and that no Arab resident of the former Palestine Mandate would have been displaced, if the Arab League had not violently rejected the November 1947 United Nations Partition Plan, alleviates Israel of any moral or legal responsibility for the fate of the 1948 refugees. Similarly, no Arab residents of the Jordanian occupied West Bank and eastern half of Jerusalem would have been displaced in the Six Day War if King Hussein had heeded Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's requests to keep Jordan out of the Egyptian-led unified Arab army that threatened to destroy Israel in the spring of 1967.
Although it has no moral or legal responsibility for the refugee problem, Israel has always recognized the need to find a humanitarian solution. However, it is unreasonable to expect Israel to cooperate with a plan that will result in the destruction of the state's fundamental Jewish character. It is for this reason that the road map's reported endorsement of the Saudi peace initiative is problematic. The Saudi initiative, while innovative in some regards, also continues to promote the right of return and, as such, is a diplomatic non-starter.
To make a constructive contribution to the peace process, Canada must formally acknowledge this fact and continue to promote the idea of options for Palestinian refugees beyond the right of return. Canada should also encourage steps to address the unresolved claims for lost homes and properties on the part of the hundreds of thousands of Jews forced from Arab and Muslim countries around the time of Israel's founding. This would go a long way toward reassuring Israelis that the discussion of the sensitive Middle East "refugee problem" is being conducted in a fair-minded fashion.
Recommendations:
A. As a stakeholder in the peace process, Canada is entitled to recommend steps for getting the diplomatic process back on track, but it must ensure that all sides are treated equally and not place the onus on Israel.
B. Canada must ensure that its policy statements regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict reflect prevailing realities. Canada’s continued reference to the “Oslo peace process” is hollow in light of the collapse of the process under the weight of Yasser Arafat’s rebuffing of the Camp David (July 2000) and Taba (January 2001) negotiations, and the resumed use of violence, terror and anti-Israel incitement as tools of Palestinian diplomacy.
C. Canada must reiterate the principle articulated in the Mitchell and Tenet reports: no diplomatic progress is possible until there is an absolute and verifiable end to terrorism directed by the PA against Israel. In addition, Canada must join the United States in conditioning support for a Palestinian state on an absolute end to terror and substantive reform within the PA, including democratization and regime change.
IV. Conclusion
The coming months will present many challenges to the international community as it focuses on peace-building in the Middle East. Canada has a real opportunity to make a significant and constructive contribution to this process. The failure of the Oslo Peace Accord should serve as a constant reminder to Canada that new approached is necessary to solve this most complex issue. The Canada-Israel Committee hopes that this document will assist the government in its orientation to the challenges ahead.
Once again we commend the Government of Canada and Foreign Minister Bill Graham for allowing Canadian civil society the opportunity to participate in this foreign policy review process. |
